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Abstract
Global imbalances are considered as one of the main culprits of the ¯nancial
crisis which started in the United States in 2007. This paper aims to build and
calibrate a two-country growth model with overlapping generations to investigate
the e®ect of a "global saving glut" on the current account balance of the developed
and developing economies. Calibrated on IMF data and forecasts between 1981 and
2016, the model rightly predicts the reversal of current account balances observed
at the end of the 1990s and the disappearance of global imbalances for the period
2017-2034. This paper then studies the impact of global imbalances on the world
interest rate and on the welfare of the young and old generations in the short and
long run.
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Among the factors leading to the major ¯nancial crisis which started in the United States
in 2007, some point to the persistence of large global imbalances for a decade before the
meltdown (Figure 1).1 By global imbalances it is meant that the fast-growing emerging
economies and the developing countries ¯nance the current account de¯cits of the slow-
growing advanced economies.2 This is an anomaly. Countries with a young population
and high economic growth rates, as is the case with emerging economies, are expected to
experience current account de¯cits that can be ¯nanced by foreign saving seeking high-
yield investments. Advanced economies with ageing populations and low growth prospects
are expected to save more and, hence, experience current account surpluses. Saving is
thus allocated where it is most productive and imbalances in current accounts reduce as
diminishing returns on capital curb the growth rates of emerging economies over time.
This international self-equilibrium market mechanism is ine®ective when the advanced
economies o®er safer stores of value for the saving of the export-led developing world and
thus ¯nance their growth and their external de¯cits, as has been the case since 1996.3
Large current account imbalances already occurred in the past, as in the 1980s, but they
were limited to the developed economies. Nowadays, they are truly global, involve rich
and developing countries, and their size is a serious challenge for the stability of the world
economy.4 This is the result of the political and economic changes of the last twenty
years. The integration of the countries of the former Soviet Bloc into the world goods
and capital markets and the international integration of capital markets have created a
huge global capital market. In this international capital market, global imbalances such
as those observed since 1996 can now occur. Some have expressed concern regarding the
systemic risks these global imbalances could create for the world economy ((IMF 2005),
(Krugman 2007) and (Obstfeld and Rogo® 2007)). (Bernanke 2005; Bernanke 2007)
expresses greater con¯dence regarding the ability of the market to gradually resolve the
external imbalances.
The origins of these global imbalances are also debated. (Bernanke 2005) challenged the
common view that was held at the time that the large U.S. current account de¯cit was
due to the U.S. economic policies responsible for the low domestic saving and the frenzied
1This question is controversial. For instance, (Bernanke 2009), (BIS 2009), (Obstfeld and Rogo®
2009) and (Portes 2009) argue that the global imbalances played a major role in the recent ¯nancial
crisis. (Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti 2010) think that the failures of the ¯nancial system are the trigger
for the ¯nancial crisis and contributed to the widening of global imbalances. (Laibson and Mollerstrom
2010) and (Whelan 2010) challenge the link between global imbalances and the ¯nancial crisis.
2This de¯nition re°ects the pattern of global imbalances currently observed but global imbalances
could result from the current account de¯cits and surpluses of any groups of countries. In the 1980s,
current account imbalances involved mainly advanced economies, namely the U.S. and Japan.
3(Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti 2010) show that the ratio of the absolute value of the world current
account balances to the world GDP was stable from 1970 to 1996 and started to increase sharply from
then on.
4In fact, the current global imbalances are mainly a current account imbalance between the United
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Figure 1: Current account balance as a percentage of world output (1981-2016)
consumption of foreign goods. He argued that the reversal in the current account positions
of the emerging economies in the second half of the 1990s created a \global saving glut"
allowing the cheap ¯nancing of the U.S. current account de¯cit and accounting for both
the widening of global imbalances and the low level of real interest rates. Bernanke puts
forward several reasons to explain this reversal. First, many developing and emerging
economies modi¯ed their economic policies after the series of ¯nancial crises in the 1990s
so as to yield current account surpluses and build foreign exchange reserves in order
to reduce the ¯nancial liquidity risk in case of a sudden change in foreign investors'
behavior. Second, other countries, such as China, maintained their export-led growth
policy by preventing their currency from appreciating. Third, the rise in oil prices during
the last decade in°ated the income of oil-exporting countries and, hence, increased their
level of saving. Finally, the deep and liquid U.S. ¯nancial markets provided a highly
attractive heaven for this foreign saving glut. All these factors contributed to increasing
saving in developing countries and enabling the U.S. and other industrial countries to
a®ord to live on credit. In order to account for global imbalances, (Caballero, Farhi,
2and Gourinchas 2008) add to Bernanke's hypothesis the underdevelopment of ¯nancial
markets in emerging countries. In their model, increasing saving in emerging countries
does not ¯nd su±cient sound local stores of value and, therefore, a rising proportion
of saving °ows to the perceived better U.S. ¯nancial markets. Thus, the widening of
the U.S. current account de¯cit, the decline in world interest rates and the increase in
U.S. assets within global portfolios are not an anomaly but rather a global equilibrium
resulting from the capital °ows in asset markets. The \global saving glut" hypothesis has
nevertheless been questioned by a number of authors stressing the fact that there has been
little evidence of excess of saving supply at the world level (IMF 2005) although Figure
2 shows that world saving as a percentage of world GDP increased sharply between 2002
and 2007. Another critical view of this hypothesis is (Laibson and Mollerstrom 2010) who
argue that the in°ows of foreign capital into the U.S. due to the saving glut should have
increased the U.S. investment rate, but this is not re°ected in the U.S. data. Calibrating
a behavioral model with an exogenous asset bubble for the U.S., the authors show that
the rise in asset and real estate prices creates a perceived wealth e®ect for consumers,
leading to a consumption boom and an associated decrease in the saving rate. Consistent
with the U.S. data, their model shows that investment is not a®ected, saving is lower,
and therefore, the U.S. current account de¯cit increases. (Taylor 2009) lies in between
these two stances. He does not dispute the fact that there was a saving glut outside the
advanced economies, which is consistent with the widening of global imbalances. However,
he argues that this saving glut was not big enough to create an excess supply of saving
at the world level. Therefore, the observed low level of real interest rates could not be
a consequence of the rise in saving in emerging economies but rather the result of the
Federal Reserve's policy. By maintaining the federal funds rate below the Taylor rule for
too long, this policy combined with the U.S. °awed regulation of the real estate market
contributed signi¯cantly to the sheer size of the real estate bubble, accounting for both
the consumption boom and the current account de¯cit in the U.S.
Although (Bernanke 2005) concludes that the world outside the U.S. is responsible for
global imbalances and (Taylor 2009) blames U.S. policies, we think that these two views
are not mutually exclusive and even reinforce each other. This paper adopts Bernanke's
hypothesis that global imbalances emerged as a sudden and prolonged increase in saving
in the developing countries. This increase is observed right after the ¯nancial crises in
emerging countries and the implementation of tough IMF rescue programs in the second
half of the 1990s. These crises seem to have durably changed the behaviors of consumers,
the banking sector and the governments in the emerging and developing countries. In the
countries hit by these crises, consumers became more risk-averse, the banks reevaluated
risks and reduced credit to households and ¯rms, while the governments adopted tight
monetary and ¯scal policies in order not to be dependent on foreign saving ((IMF 2000)).
In the other countries, the governments seem to have drawn lessons from these crises and
started to implement policies allowing them to pile up foreign reserves and thus reduce the
risk of a balance-of-payments crisis. In both cases, the repetition of ¯nancial crises and
government intervention have led to forced saving in this group of countries taken globally.
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Figure 2: Gross national saving and investment as a percentage of GDP (1981-2016)
[Logarithmic scale; (S): saving and (I): investment]
public debt decreased and current account balances recorded hefty surpluses.
Our objective is to test the \global saving glut" hypothesis by calibrating a simple growth
model. The model extends (Buiter 1981) by considering a two-country overlapping gen-
erations (OLG) model with forced saving { represented by an exogenous increase in the
preference parameter { in the emerging economy. After deriving the theoretical properties
and predictions of the model, we test them by using the IMF data and forecasts for the
group of the advanced economies and the group of the emerging and developing economies
between 1981 and 2016. Although it slightly underestimates the magnitude of global im-
balances, the model performs rather well and gives credit to Bernanke's hypothesis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 de¯nes the two-country overlapping genera-
tions model and presents the dynamic equilibrium in open economy. Section 3 analyzes
the steady-state current account balances when tastes and population growth rates di®er
across countries. Section 4 introduces global imbalances in the two-country model, and
studies the existence of an intertemporal equilibrium, the impact on the world interest rate
4and transition growth. The results of the calibrated model are presented and discussed
in Section 5. Section 6 examines the implications of global imbalances on the short-run
and long-run welfare of the young and old generations in both countries. Finally, section
7 concludes.
2 A Two-Country Model
2.1 Setup
We consider a discrete-time deterministic model of an economy consisting of two coun-
tries, A and B, producing the same good under perfect competition from date t = 0 to
in¯nity. The model builds on (Buiter 1981) and thus assumes that there is no trade in
the consumption goods.5. Each country is populated by overlapping generations living for
two periods. When young, individuals supply inelastically one unit of labor to the ¯rms,
receive a wage and allocate this income between consumption and saving. When old, they
retire and consume the return on their saving. The labor market is perfectly competitive
within the national borders while physical capital moves freely across countries from date
t = 1 onwards. We also assume that the real exchange rate is equal to one at every period,
i.e. purchasing power parity holds at all times. The representative ¯rm in each country





i;t ; i = A;B; (1)
where Ki;t is the stock of capital, Li;t is the labor input, and Ai is a technological parameter
of country i at time t. We assume that physical capital fully depreciates after one period.
At time t, the representative ¯rm of country i has an installed stock of capital Ki;t, chooses
the labor input paid at the competitive wage wi;t, equal to the marginal product of labor,
and maximizes its pro¯ts
¼i;t = Aik
®
i;t ¡ wi;t; (2)
where ¼i;t = Ri;tki;t are the pro¯ts per worker distributed to the owners of the capital stock,
the interest factor Ri;t is equal to the marginal product of capital, and ki;t ´ Ki;t=Li;t is
the capital-labor ratio.
The representative agent of country i maximizes a logarithmic additively separable utility
function
Ui = lnci;t + ¯i lndi;t+1 (3)
5The balance of payments in this model is reduced to the ¯nancial balance only, which is the symmetric
account of the current account. This allows to keep the framework simple.
5subject to the budget constraints
ci;t + si;t = wi;t (4)
di;t+1 = Ri;t+1si;t; (5)
where ci;t is consumption when young and si;t is individual saving at time t. When old, the
individuals consume di;t+1. The parameter ¯i > 0 is the psychological discount factor in
country i. We assume that this parameter may have di®erent values across countries. The








Individual saving depends only on the marginal product of labor and the preference pa-
rameter ¯i. The lower ¯i, ceteris paribus, the higher the preference for the present and
the lower the level of saving.
2.2 The Open-Economy Equilibrium
It is assumed that the owners of the capital stock at date t = 0 in both countries cannot
move this stock from one country to the other. From date t = 1 onwards, capital moves
freely across countries in a frictionless international capital market while labor is immo-
bile. The equilibrium in the national labor market is thus given by the equality between
the national supply and demand for labor. Since the labor supply is inelastic and the
production function exhibits constant returns to scale, the national equilibrium wage is
equal to the marginal product of labor. The equilibrium in the world goods market at
period t is given by the world income accounts identity:
YA;t + YB;t = LA;tcA;t + LA;t¡1dA;t + LB;tcB;t + LB;t¡1dB;t + IA;t + IB;t; (7)
where the world output is equal to the aggregate consumption of the young and the
old generations and the aggregate investment in both countries. Full depreciation of the
current capital stock in each country implies IA;t = KA;t+1 and IB;t = KB;t+1.
The integration of capital markets thus occurs at date t = 1. The equilibrium in the
international capital market, once capital is mobile across countries, derives from (7) and
yields:
KA;t+1 + KB;t+1 = LA;tsA;t + LB;tsB;t: (8)
The perfect mobility on the international capital market makes domestic and foreign
assets perfect substitutes. At the world level, total investment must equal total saving.











By using Equations (6), (8) and (9), we can compute the intertemporal equilibrium with
























































































The level of ¹ ki increases with an increase in the psychological discount factor of both
countries. At the steady state, the capital stock per worker and hence the income per
capita remains constant.
3 The Balance of Payments
In an open two-country world, a country can ¯nance domestic investment by foreign
saving. The di®erence between domestic investment and domestic saving is equal to
the current account balance. In other words, a country can spend more or less than it
produces. The national income accounts identity of country i in this two-country economy
is
Yi;t + Rt(Li;t¡1si;t¡1 ¡ Ki;t) = Li;tci;t + Li;t¡1di;t + Ki;t+1 + Gi;t; (14)
7where Yi;t and Rt(Li;tsi;t ¡ Ki;t+1) are the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the net
factor income from abroad respectively, and the sum of the two is the Gross National
Income (GNI) of country i at time t. On the right hand side of the identity, Gi;t is the
di®erence between domestic spending on foreign capital and foreign spending on domestic
capital. In this model of one single good, where there is no trade in consumption goods
and there are no unilateral transfers, Gi;t is the current account balance of country i at
time t. This is simply the di®erence between the factor income from abroad and the factor
income payments to the foreign country. In intensive form, taking into account the fact
that yi;t = wi;t + Rtki;t, the current account balance is equal to
gi;t = wi;t +
Li;t¡1
Li;t







or, equivalently, since di;t = Rtsi;t¡1,




Without loss of generality, we focus on country A. The conditions on the current account
balance per worker are as follows:
















The current account balance of country A is an increasing function of kA;t, ¯A, and the
population growth rate of country B, and a decreasing function of kB;t, ¯B and the
population growth rate of country A. When capital is free to move from one country to
another,

















Condition (18) is also the condition for gA S 0 at the steady state.
Proposition 1 In a two-country model with overlapping generations living for two peri-








8Proof: This result derives easily from condition (18) and is a generalization of the results
of (Buiter 1981) to the case with di®erences in population growth rates between countries.
Assuming that two countries are identical in all respects except in the preference param-
eter ¯, a country populated with more impatient consumers (lower ¯) will have a lower
¹ k and a higher steady-state capital return than the country populated with more patient
consumers. If capital markets are integrated, the country with impatient consumers will
attract foreign investment owing to a higher capital return up to the point where capital
returns are equal. Therefore, this country will have a current account de¯cit.
On the other hand, assuming that two countries are identical in all respects except in their
demographic patterns, a country with a fast-growing population will have a lower ¹ k and
a higher steady-state capital return than the country with a slow-growing population. If
capital markets are integrated, the country with the higher population growth will attract
foreign investment up to the point where capital returns are equal. Therefore, the country
with the fast-growing population will record a current account de¯cit.6
As a consequence, even in a country with thrifty consumers, the level of the preference
parameter may not be su±ciently high to compensate for the negative e®ect of a higher
population growth rate on its current account. The higher the di®erential in population
growth rates across countries, the higher the di®erential in the preference parameters must
be.
4 A Two-Country Model with Global Imbalances
In this section, we consider a two-country world in which country A is a developing econ-
omy and country B is an advanced economy. Unlike (Buiter 1981) who considers countries
di®ering only by their psychological discount factor, we allow countries to di®er in initial
levels of development and population growth rate. The development gap is captured by
the technological parameter and the initial capital stocks per worker (before capital mar-
ket integration): AA < AB and kA;0 < kB;0. We will also assume that the government of
country A intervenes whenever the market outcome yields a current account de¯cit. Its
intervention is represented by a constraint in the consumer's optimization programme and
is evidenced by a change in the value of the parameter ¯A so as to generate a current ac-
count balance positive or null. The government's policy can thus be interpreted as forced
saving. This section is organized as follows. First, we de¯ne an intertemporal equilibrium
with global imbalances. Second, the conditions for country A's government intervention
are established. Third, we study the existence of an intertemporal equilibrium with global
imbalances. Fourth, we examine the level of global saving and the real interest rate when
there is government intervention. We end this section by the transition dynamics and
assess the e®ect of government intervention on growth.
6Empirical studies ¯nd that countries with low dependency ratios tend to experience current account
surpluses and countries with high fertility rates and young populations tend to experience current account
de¯cits ((Higgins 1998) and (IMF 2004) for instance).
94.1 Intertemporal Equilibrium with Global Imbalances: De¯ni-
tion
Given AA < AB or/and kA;0 < kB;0, an intertemporal equilibrium with global imbalances
is a sequence of temporary equilibria that satis¯es gA;t > 0 for all t > 0.
4.2 Country A's Government Intervention
From Equations (17) and (18), we can identify nine potential trajectories for gA, the cur-
rent account balance per worker in the developing economy. Assuming that international
capital integration is achieved at t = 1, Table 1 displays these nine potential trajectories
as well as the conditions under which they arise. By assumption, the government of coun-
try A intervenes whenever the current account balance is negative. Three cases (7, 8 and
9) are mainly of interest since the government of country A can intervene at the initial
date to avoid the current account de¯cit yielded by the market. In cases 7 and 8, the
government can intervene only at t = 0, since the current account balance is nonnegative
for t > 0. Cases 7 and 8 can thus be grouped together. In case 9, the government can
intervene at all times. Cases 3 and 6 can be omitted as they match case 9 when the






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































114.3 Existence of an Intertemporal Equilibrium with Global Im-
balances
After identifying the conditions under which the government of country A intervenes
to guarantee nonnegative current account balances, we can now address the question of
whether an intertemporal equilibrium with global imbalances exists. As already men-
tioned, we de¯ne an intertemporal equilibrium with global imbalances by a sequence of
temporary equilibria in which the current account balance of country A is never negative.
We study the existence condition and determine the policy response of the government to
ensure nonnegative current account balances. The model is identical to the one de¯ned
in Section 2 with an integrated international capital market except for country A's con-
sumer's optimization programme. If gA;t > 0 is veri¯ed at each period, then the decision
to save by the individuals is given by (6) and the government does not intervene. If
gA;t < 0, the government acts on ¯A to guarantee gA;t > 0. As a consequence, focusing
on the three cases of interest de¯ned in Section 4.2, the government modi¯es ¯A at t = 0
only for cases 7 and 8 and at each period for case 9.
Proposition 2 In a two-country model with overlapping generations living for two pe-

















Proof: gA;t > 0 for all t > 0 if condition (17) is veri¯ed. The necessary value for ¯A
derives from this condition.
If the expression in square brackets is positive, then the threshold given by condition (20)
increases with the increase in the population growth rate of country A. If condition (20)
is not satis¯ed by the preference parameter of country A's representative consumer, then
country A's government intervenes to impose a value for ¯A that satis¯es this condition.
Proposition 2 establishes that, with a perfect integrated capital market, the global im-
balances are an equilibrium result when the fast-growing economy displays a su±ciently
higher propensity to save than the slow-growing economy. The larger the di®erence be-
tween the preference parameters across countries, the larger global imbalances. This
higher propensity to save in the fast-growing economy may result from the consumer
preferences or from forced saving imposed by government policies. In the former case,
the equilibrium is a pure market outcome. The lack of social insurance or the uneasy
access to credit can explain why the propensity to save is higher in emerging countries.
If this is caused by forced saving, global imbalances are the result of a government's in-
tervention. Self-insurance against disruptive adjustments in the balance of payments is
generally put forward to account for such a public policy. Empirically, the (IMF 2005)
12study shows that the saving rate declined in advanced economies and increased in emerg-
ing and oil-producing economies at the end of the 1990s, yielding a reversal in current
account balances in emerging economies and leading to large global imbalances. This
reversal can be explained by government intervention in emerging economies after the
Asian ¯nancial crisis.
4.4 Global Saving and the Interest Rate
The increase in ¯A yields a higher average propensity to save in country A and a rise in
world saving ceteris paribus. The variation in saving is matched by that of investment
since both quantities ought to be equal at the world equilibrium. The world (gross) interest
rate Rt is nevertheless a®ected by an increase in global saving through diminishing returns
to capital accumulation. Therefore, if ¯A does not satisfy condition (20), the government
intervenes, ¯A increases and the new interest rate is lower.7
Proposition 3 In a two-country model with overlapping generations living for two pe-
riods, the interest rate of the integrated capital market decreases, ceteris paribus, when
country A's government intervenes to satisfy condition (20).
Proof: If ¯A does not satisfy condition (20), the government intervenes, ¯A increases
and so does the capital stock per worker, kA;t+1. Therefore, due to the diminishing returns
to capital, the rental rate of capital of country A decreases. Country B's capital becomes
more attractive and consumers of country A invest in country B up to the point where
the equality RA;t+1 = RB;t+1 is restored. In the end, the interest rate is lower than before
country A's government intervention.
Real interest rates have gradually declined in the world over the last two decades to levels
not seen since the 1970s. A number of variables such as the weak labor force growth in rich
countries and demographic changes in the world can account for this evolution (Desroches
and Francis 2010). As this simple two-country growth model shows, the emergence of
global imbalances due to an increase in global saving is also a possible candidate cause to
account for the observed low levels of the world real interest rates at low levels.
4.5 Transition Dynamics and Comparative Statics
The transition dynamics in the two countries are governed by the following equations:
7Due to the assumption of logarithmic utility, the interest rate has no e®ect on saving. Therefore,
there is no ambiguity of a variation in ¯A on global saving. Figure 2 shows clearly that the decline in












































The capital stock per worker in both countries at time t + 1 is a positive function of kA;t
and kB;t. At the steady state, the growth rate of the capital stock per worker is zero in
both countries. If country A's government has to intervene in period t to satisfy condition
(20), this a®ects either the growth rate or the steady state level of the capital stock per
worker in both countries.
Proposition 4 In a two-country model with overlapping generations living for two pe-
riods, country A's government intervention in period t to satisfy condition (20) implies,
ceteris paribus, a higher growth rate of the capital stock per capita in both countries.
Proof: The transition dynamics in the two countries are governed by Equation (21) for
country A and Equation (22) for country B. It is straightforward to show that, if the
preference parameter of country A increases in period t, the growth rate of the capital
stock per worker (and hence of the income per worker) between the generations t and
t+1 increases, ceteris paribus, in both countries along their transition path to the steady
state.
5 Calibration
In this section, we calibrate our model with real-world data for the group of advanced
economies and the group of emerging and developing economies as de¯ned by the IMF.
Data on GDP in purchasing-power parity (PPP) (Y ), gross national saving as a percentage
of GDP (s=y), current account balances as a percentage of GDP (g=y) and population
levels (L) are retrieved from the IMF World Economic Outlook of April 2011 and cover the
period from 1981 to 2016 (forecasts from 2011 onwards) for both groups of countries. We
¯rst rewrite Equations (6) and (16) so as to obtain saving and current account balances






















Assuming that capital market are integrated and using Equation (10), we ¯nd:
gA;t
yA;t





















In our calibration exercise, we split the period 1981-2016 into two subperiods of 18 annual
observations as 1998 marks the start of a sharp and durable increase in the saving rate of
the group of emerging economies. Table 2 shows the data and the assumptions made. We
use the average gross national saving in percentage of GDP for both groups of countries
over both subperiods in Equation (23) to estimate the values for ¯A and ¯B. We rename
these estimates as ¯EE ´ ¯A and ¯AE ´ ¯B (where AE and EE respectively stand
for advanced and emerging and developing economies). Following the same approach,
we use average values for GDP in PPP and population levels to estimate the current
account balance of emerging countries in Equation (25) and rename them accordingly.
The unknown population levels at the future subperiod which are needed in the calculation
of the current account balance during the second subperiod are computed assuming the
same growth rate as between the ¯rst and the second subperiod. The capital share in
output ® is assumed to be the same for both groups and to be equal to 0.3.
Before examining the performance of the calibrated model, it is important to emphasize
the possible results of an increase in the average propensity to save in the emerging
and developing countries. In each of these countries, the additional saving could ¯nance
domestic investment, investment in other emerging economies or investment in advanced
countries. The \saving glut" hypothesis assumes that a large part of this additional saving
is used to buy assets in advanced economies which is re°ected in the size of the global
imbalances between developed and developing countries. This is precisely this hypothesis
we want to test in this calibrated model. Using data on saving, we can run the model to
calculate the quantitative e®ect of the actual increase in the average propensity to save
on the current account balance. The ¯gure we obtain for the current account balance per
unit of GDP is necessary the aggregate result of four dynamic forces at work in our model:
the growth of the relative population size, the relative speed of capital accumulation, the
growth of the relative e±ciency ratio and the international capital mobility.
First, we assign a value for the ratio
AAE
AEE such that the calibrated current account balance
of the group of emerging countries in subperiod 1 matches its actual value, i.e. -1.57% of
GDP. Although a ratio lower than one can also yield a negative current account balance
for emerging countries, we can notice that the calibrated ratio is higher than 1, which is
consistent with the fact that this group of countries is less developed than the group of
15Table 2: Calibration
Emerging economies Advanced economies
1981-1998 1999-2016 2017 ¡ 2034¤ 1981-1998 1999-2016 2017 ¡ 2034¤
Data (IMF 2011)
si;t=yi;t 22.24% 31.06% 21.60% 19.47%
Li;t (in billions) 4.07 5.61 0.88 1.00
¢Li;t=Li;t 37.92% 14.21%
Yi;t=Yj;t 0.52 0.86 1.92 1.16
Assumptions
®i;t 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
¢Li;t=Li;t 37.92% 14.21%
Ai;t=Aj;t 0.11 0.18 0.29 9.34 5.67 3.44
Yi;t=Yj;t 1.42 0.70
b ¯i;t 0.47 0.80 0.80 0.45 0.39 0.39
* All the values in the column 2017-2034 are assumed to be same for all subsequent periods.
advanced economies. The objective is then to assess the performance of the model for
the second subperiod when we use the actual values for L and Y and the estimated ¯ of
both groups in subperiod 2 (1999-2016). We estimate the value of
gEE;2
yEE;2, assuming that
the variation in the ratio
AAE
AEE is equal to the growth rate of the relative income between
1999 and 2016, and compare it to the actual value of the current account balance of
the group of emerging countries. The calibrated model yields a positive current account
balance for the emerging countries, which means that condition (18) is satis¯ed. However,
the model slightly underestimates the magnitude of the surplus as it predicts a current
account balance per GDP of 1.87% instead of an actual value of 2.36% (Table 3). Despite
its simplicity and the strong assumption of perfect capital mobility, this calibrated model
rightly predicts the sign of the current account balance actually observed and stresses the
e®ect of an increase in the average propensity to save in the group of emerging economies.
Even though it tends to underestimate the magnitude of the current account balance, the
performance of this model gives credit to the \saving glut" hypothesis.
Our last exercise consists in running the model in order to see whether global imbalances
will keep on increasing or disappear in the next period (2017-2034). We assume that the
saving rates, population growth rates and income growth rates remain the same as for
the period 1998-2016. The evolution of the e±ciency ratio is assumed to be identical to
that of the income ratio. The model predicts that the group of emerging countries will
experience an average current account balance of -0.4% of GDP, which implies that global
imbalances disappear over this period.
For all our predictions, the results are sensitive to the e±ciency ratio
AAE
AEE only, as this
is the unique parameter for which we have no real data neither available estimates. The
slower the catching-up of the emerging economies in terms of e±ciency, the bigger global
imbalances in the second and subsequent periods and the more slowly global imbalances
will disappear.
16Table 3: Calibration results
1981-1998 1999-2016 2017-2034
Prediction IMF data Prediction IMF data Prediction
gi;t=yi;t -1.58% -1.58% 1.87% 2.36% -0.44%
6 Global Imbalances and Welfare Analysis
In section 4 it was shown that a higher ¯A imposed by country A's government yields a
higher transition income growth rate or a higher steady-state income per worker in both
countries. It now remains to ¯nd how the welfare of the young and the old generations is
modi¯ed when ¯A is increased in the short and the long run. Without loss of generality,
we will assume that the population growth rates are equal across countries.
6.1 Short-Run Welfare Analysis
Short-run welfare analysis refers to the ¯rst two periods of the economy. Two changes
may occur during this timespan: the integration of the capital markets and country A's
government intervention on ¯A. First, recall that the capital markets of both countries
are assumed to integrate between t = 0 and t = 1. (Buiter 1981) shows that, in a two-
country model with overlapping generations living for two periods, the welfare of the old
generations of both countries born at t = ¡1 is una®ected by the international capital
integration, while the young generation born at t = 0 of the country with the higher
(lower) psychological discount factor is raised (reduced). The result is obvious for the old
generations as their welfare is determined by the past capital stock per worker. For the
young generations, the result depends on the e®ect on the interest rate of the integration
of capital markets. Since the capital stock per worker is higher in the country with the
higher psychological discount factor, its interest rate is lower than in the foreign country,
and therefore increases when capital markets are integrated. An increase in the interest
rate has no e®ect on the saving decision of the young agents, as their preferences are
logarithmic, but it does raise the level of their utility. The opposite is true for the country
with the lower psychological discount factor. In that country, the integration of capital
markets results in a decrease in the interest rate and yields a lower level of utility for the
young generation.
Second, when capital is free to move from one country to another, country A's government
imposes an increase in ¯A whenever it is required to avoid a current account de¯cit. The
welfare e®ect of this intervention is established in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 In a two-country model with overlapping generations living for two peri-
ods and with integrated capital markets, the welfare of the old generation of both countries
born at t = ¡1 is una®ected by the increase in ¯A imposed by country A's government.
In contrast, the welfare e®ect on the young generation born at t = 0 in both countries is
negative.
17Proof: As previously, the welfare of the old generations is determined by the past capital
stock per worker and is not a®ected by a change in ¯A. For the young generations, the
proof is given in the Appendix.
(Buiter 1981) considers the welfare e®ect on the young and the old generations when the
economy moves from autarky to open economy between t = 0 and t = 1. Proposition 5
compares the welfare of the young and the old generations in an open economy without
government intervention and in an open economy with government intervention. The
result is unambiguous: the welfare of the old generations in both countries is unchanged,
while the young generations in both countries are worse o®. Before analyzing the welfare
e®ect of country A's government intervention in the long run, it would be interesting to
study the welfare e®ect on the young and the old generations when the economy moves
from autarky to open economy with government intervention between t = 0 and t = 1.
Proposition 6 In a two-country model with overlapping generations living for two peri-
ods, the welfare of the old generations born at t = ¡1 is una®ected as the economy moves
from autarky to an open economy with country A's government intervention. In contrast,
the e®ect on the welfare of the young generation born at t = 0 in country A is negative
while it is ambiguous for country B.
Proof: Proof for Proposition 6 can be easily derived from (Buiter 1981)'s results and
Proposition 5.
If we consider that the integration of capital markets and the government intervention of
one country occur in the same period (between t = 0 and t = 1), then the welfare e®ect
on the young and old generations that has to be considered relates to Proposition 6. In
particular, the government intervention in country A worsens the welfare of the young
generation of country B and, thus, can o®set the gain of the international integration of
capital markets for this generation.
6.2 Long-Run Welfare Analysis
Long-run welfare analysis refers to the steady state. (Buiter 1981) analyzes the case of an
economy moving from autarky to integrated capital markets. In this section, we study the
welfare e®ect on the young and old generations in an open two-country economy, in which
country A's government has to intervene at the steady state (case 9 in Table 1) in order
to avoid current account de¯cits. In the standard OLG model, the maximum of welfare is
attained when the competitive equilibrium coincides with the golden rule. Whereas this
remains true for country B in our model, in country A, the welfare gain from moving
closer to the golden rule may be o®set by the welfare loss resulting from the modi¯cation
of the intertemporal consumption allocation imposed by country A's government increase
in ¯A.
18Proposition 7 In a two-country model with overlapping generations living for two peri-
ods and with integrated capital markets, country A's government intervention may result
in an increase in the welfare of country B's young and old generations at the steady
state if and only if the market outcome without government intervention leads to capital
under-accumulation. Otherwise, the welfare is unambiguously decreased.
Proof: Country A's government intervention always results in a higher steady-state
capital stock per worker in both countries. As a result, it can only be closer to the golden
rule capital stock per worker in country B if the economy experiences under-accumulation
of capital without government intervention. If the capital stock per worker is initially
higher than the golden rule, it can only move away from the optimum.
Proposition 8 The results of Proposition 7 remain true for country A. However, country
A's generations undergo a speci¯c welfare loss due to the imposed di®erent intertemporal
allocation of consumption. As a consequence, even an outcome closer to the golden rule
can coincide with a lower level of welfare.
Proof: See the proof for Proposition 7. In addition, we can show that for a given level of
capital stock per capita (~ k), any change in the intertemporal consumption allocation re-
sults in a decreased welfare level. The intertemporal utility of the representative consumer


















where ¯A is the discount factor of the representative consumer and ¯C is the discount
factor imposed by the government. Since the utility function is concave, we know that
utility attains a maximum under the budget constraint whenever ¯C = ¯A. If ¯C 6= ¯A,
then utility is lower. Hence, for a given capital stock per worker, if the imposed discount
factor, ¯C, is higher than the representative consumer's preference parameter, ¯A, the
welfare of the generations of country A is decreased.
7 Conclusion
Since the end of the 1990s, the world economy has been characterized by large global im-
balances, i.e. a situation in which the fast-growing economies ¯nance the current account
de¯cits of the advanced economies. The purpose of this paper is to build and calibrate
a two-country growth model with overlapping generations to investigate the e®ect of the
\global saving glut" ((Bernanke 2005)) on the current account balance of the developed
and developing economies. A number of results are obtained. Proposition 1 derives the
19conditions for steady-state current account de¯cits (surplus) when two economies di®er in
their tastes, in their population growth rates, or both. Proposition 2 gives the condition
for an intertemporal equilibrium with global imbalances to exist. Proposition 3 shows
that a government's intervention in the fast-growing economy to avoid current account
de¯cits implies a decrease in the world interest rate, while its e®ect on the transition
growth rate is positive (Proposition 4).
We calibrated this model with averaged IMF data over two periods of 18 annual observa-
tions. While the simplicity of the model allows us to make only one assumption regarding
parameter values (e±ciency ratio
AAE
AEE), it correctly predicts the reversal of the current
account balance of emerging countries in the period 1999-2016. In addition, the model
predicts that global imbalances will disappear during the period 2017-2034.
Propositions 5 and 6 analyze the welfare e®ect of both the integration of capital markets
and the government's intervention in the fast-growing country on the young and the
old generations. While this e®ect is null for the old generations in both countries, it
is negative for the young generation of the fast-growing economy and is ambiguous for
the young generation of the slow-growing economy. In the long run, the e®ect of the
government's intervention in the fast-growing country on the welfare of the young and the
old generations in the slow-growing country may be positive if there is under-accumulation
of capital and is negative otherwise (Proposition 7). The welfare e®ect on the young and
the old generations of the fast-growing country is more complicated as the government
of this country modi¯es their choice of intertemporal allocation of income. Proposition 8
shows that this welfare e®ect is negative.
This framework with perfect capital markets can be extended in a number of ways. For
instance, the model is °exible enough to add capital market imperfections in order to study
the relationship between global imbalances and imperfections in the capital markets in
slow-growing economies. Another interesting line of research would be a framework in
which purchasing power parity does not hold and in which exchange rates are subject to
manipulation.
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228 Appendix
To prove that the welfare e®ect of country A's government intervention on country A's
young generation born at t = 0 is negative (Proposition 5), it su±ces to study the di®er-
ence between the utility U0 of the young generation resulting from the market outcome,
and the utility UC
0 resulting from any other imposed psychological discount factor ¯C,
ceteris paribus. This di®erence can be expressed as:







































where D(¯C) is the di®erence between the utilities of the young generation without and
with government intervention, and kC;1 the per capita stock of capital in country A at
t = 1 under the optimization based on ¯C instead of ¯A.
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23If ¯C = ¯A, then D(¯C) = 0. Whenever it is required, country A's government interven-
tion results in a higher preference parameter than that of the representative consumer.
Therefore, we merely have to compute the ¯rst derivative of D(¯C) with respect to ¯C



















If ¯C > ¯A, Equation (31) is positive. Therefore, the utility of country A's young genera-
tion born at t = 0 diminishes when its government has to intervene (cases 7, 8 and 9) in
order to avoid a current account de¯cit. We can conclude that the welfare of country A's
young generation is lower in an open economy with countryA's government intervention
than in an open economy without government intervention.
Let us now turn to the welfare e®ect of country A's government intervention on country
B's young generation born at t = 0. Proposition 5 states that the welfare e®ect is also
negative. The welfare of country B's young generation born at t = 0 is only a®ected
through the modi¯cation of the world interest rate at t = 1. The saving decision of this
young generation is una®ected by the modi¯cation of ¯A but its consumption in the next
period is in°uenced by the world interest rate at t = 1. An increase in ¯A results in more
saving in country A leading to a lower world interest rate at t = 1. This lower interest
rate decreases the consumption of country B's young generation (born at t = 0) at t = 1
while leaving unchanged its consumption level at t = 0 due to the logarithmic form of the
utility function. In total, the welfare of this young generation decreases. Consequently,
any increase in ¯A results in a decrease in the welfare of the young generation at t = 0 in
country B.
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